Maybe the coming negotiations will produce a serious final agreement. Maybe they will result in strict enrichment limits, a verifiable process for reducing or disposing of enriched uranium, restrictions on centrifuge production, restored IAEA access, and meaningful consequences for violations.
If so, that would be important.
But that is not what exists yet.
What exists now is an off-ramp from a war Trump should not have started.
The memorandum reportedly calls for an end to the “current war,” which is itself a striking phrase after months of insistence that U.S. strikes against Iran did not require congressional war authorization because they did not constitute a war. It also appears to reach beyond direct U.S.-Iran hostilities, committing the parties and their allies to halt military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon.¹ That language raises obvious questions about Israel, Hezbollah, and whether Iran can use American commitments to press Washington over Israeli military action.
Those questions may be answerable. But they are not minor.
The Strait of Hormuz is the real center of the bargain. Iran agrees to help restore safe commercial passage. The United States agrees to ease its blockade.¹ The world gets a chance to avoid an oil shock.
That is a good thing.
It is also a reminder of what made the war so reckless. Iran did not have to defeat the United States militarily to create a crisis. It only had to threaten the passage of energy through one of the world’s most important waterways. Geography gave Iran leverage that bombs could not erase.
Before the war, the Strait was open and the world economy was not bargaining over its reopening. Trump escalated, Iran threatened a global economic artery, and now the United States is negotiating to restore conditions that existed before the shooting began.
That is why the agreement may be necessary and strategically costly at the same time.
The sanctions provisions should be described carefully. Early reporting indicates that some relief is immediate or near-term, especially oil-related waivers, while broader sanctions relief and economic benefits are tied to implementation steps and future negotiations.¹,⁶ That distinction matters. It would be unfair to say Iran simply receives everything up front with no conditions.
But it would also be misleading to ignore the direction of the bargain. The memorandum opens the door to oil sales, financial permissions, access to restricted assets, and a major reconstruction or economic development plan if a final agreement is reached.¹,⁶ The United States is offering economic incentives in exchange for de-escalation now and nuclear commitments later.
That may be practical diplomacy.
It is not the triumph Trump promised when he tore up the JCPOA.
Richard Haass, who opposed the war from the start, puts the matter more starkly. The United States, he argues, has paid a great deal to restore something close to the prewar status quo in the Strait of Hormuz, and may not fully get even that. He calls the emerging deal a major victory for Iran’s government.⁷ Whether that proves to be the final verdict will depend on the next agreement.