The Iran war offers a similar opportunity. Turkish diplomats have already signaled their willingness to facilitate negotiations aimed at containing the conflict. Even when mediation produces little concrete progress, the act of hosting discussions strengthens Ankara’s geopolitical relevance. In diplomacy, relevance is a form of power.
For Erdoğan, that external leverage intersects directly with domestic politics.
The trial unfolding in Istanbul illustrates why. Human Rights Watch has described the prosecution of İmamoğlu as part of a broader effort to weaken political challengers to Erdoğan’s government.³ The indictment spans thousands of pages and includes hundreds of defendants connected to the Istanbul municipal administration, a scope that Turkish opposition figures argue is designed to dismantle the political network surrounding the country’s most prominent opposition figure before the next national election cycle.
In previous years cases like this routinely triggered strong criticism from European governments. Statements from Brussels condemning democratic backsliding in Turkey were common.
This time the reaction has been quieter.
Part of the reason is simple attention economics. The Iran war dominates diplomatic agendas, energy markets, and military planning. But the quieter response also reflects a deeper calculation. Europe needs Turkey more during regional instability than it does during calm periods. That dependency does not eliminate criticism of Erdoğan’s domestic policies, but it changes the threshold at which governments are willing to escalate it.
None of this means the war is purely beneficial for Turkey. In fact, the same conflict that enhances Ankara’s geopolitical leverage also threatens its economic stability.
Turkey imports most of its energy, making the country highly sensitive to oil price spikes. Prolonged disruption in Persian Gulf supply routes could feed directly into inflation inside Turkey’s already fragile economy. Rising fuel costs would place additional pressure on households and complicate Erdoğan’s efforts to stabilize the Turkish lira after several turbulent economic years.
Migration pressures also carry domestic risks. Turkey already hosts millions of Syrian refugees, and public tolerance for the financial and social burden has begun to erode. Another large influx of displaced people could intensify nationalist backlash and strain government resources.
For Ankara, the most advantageous outcome is therefore not chaos but calibrated instability: a regional environment in which rivals are weakened, Turkey’s strategic value increases, and the costs of conflict remain manageable.
Late in the afternoon the courthouse doors opened again. Lawyers emerged to speak with reporters while police moved barricades along the street. The hearing had lasted most of the day.
Across the region, meanwhile, diplomats were still trying to contain a widening war.
Those two scenes — a political trial in Istanbul and a conflict spreading across the Middle East — might appear unrelated at first glance. In reality they are linked by the same geopolitical mechanism.
Wars do not simply redraw borders or destroy infrastructure. They also redistribute leverage.